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ABSTRACT: We exploit a change in the public healthcare entitlement of 
undocumented migrants in Spain to investigate the causal link between withdrawal of 
healthcare and changes in help-seeking behaviour of women experiencing intimate 
partner violence (IPV). We contribute to the new literature modelling domestic violence 
by taking a novel look at the role of human capital in decisions to seek help when in 
violent relationships. We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology to compare 
the number of foreign applicants for protection orders before and after the reform using 
Spanish applicants as the counterfactual. The impact of the reform was immediate; 
foreign applicants decreased by 16% after the health policy reform was introduced and 
this drop amounts to 19% in areas with stronger enforcement of the reform. We perform 
several robustness checks including addressing potential bias from migration changes 
after the reform. Our findings are important for current policy discussions on 
granting/limiting access to public programs for the undocumented population. We 
provide evidence that restricted access to the healthcare system can have unintended 
negative consequences for the most vulnerable groups of the population with potentially 
important spill-over effects to the next generation. 
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Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is a complex multi-factorial social problem with significant health consequences and 
economic costs. It is a major global public health concern and an underlying cause of gender inequality worldwide 
(Garcia-Moreno, 2013). Papageorge et al. (2016) apply human capital theory to intimate partner violence (IPV) and 
find that incidents of IPV were reduced when access to a healthcare innovation became available. We contribute to this 
burgeoning literature by providing novel evidence for the impact of restricting access to public healthcare for 
undocumented migrants on help-seeking behaviour of IPV victims in this population group.
2
 To identify these effects, 
we exploit a reform, introduced in Spain in 2012, which imposed such restrictions in health care access for 
undocumented migrants. We apply a difference-in-differences (DiD) model to evaluate the change in the number of 
foreign women seeking protection orders in Spain compared to native Spanish women before and after the reform.  
The focus on undocumented migrants is important. Increased immigration in developed countries has fostered political 
discussions on the extent to which undocumented migrants should get access to public programs and public benefits 
once they are in the host country. Europe has been exposed to an intense refugee crisis since 2015 and estimates show 
there are approximately 11 million undocumented migrants living in the USA, a figure that has changed little since 
2009 (Passel and Cohn, 2017). In the UK, the British government introduced a “hostile environment” immigration 
policy in 2014 which included stricter checks on access to healthcare for undocumented migrants. Campaigners 
against gender violence have collected personal accounts of the negative impact of this hostile policy on the ability of 
victims of IPV to seek help (EVAW Coalition, 2018). Our paper informs these political discussions by providing 
empirical evidence for one of the many potential impacts of restricting access to the public health care system for the 
undocumented population.  
Our results show that foreign applicants for protection orders fell by 16% after the introduction of the reform, rising to 
19% in regions where the policy was most stringently adhered to. This finding supports the theory that access to 
healthcare is important to empower victims of IPV to seek formal help and highlights the negative consequences of 
preventing sub-groups of the population from using the public healthcare system. 
                                               
2
 We use the term intimate partner violence and not domestic violence because our study includes non-domiciled partners. 
This effect may be partially explained by the bargaining theory of IPV which suggests that women accept a level of 
violence in return for intra-couple transfers. Women are assumed to have a threshold above which they will not accept 
violence and will leave the relationship. Withdrawing access to healthcare may increase this threshold by decreasing 
the availability of “outside options”. We propose that human capital theory better explains this change in help-seeking 
behaviour. We rely on two concepts from the theory of human capital. The first is that health is a form of human 
capital; healthcare is an input to health and thus to human capital (Grossman, 1972; Becker, 2007).  The second is that 
changes in human capital will shift incentives for undertaking risky behaviours (Becker, 2007; Jones et al., 2018). We 
argue that seeking-help for IPV is a potentially costly behaviour and that withdrawing access to healthcare will reduce 
expected future health, resulting in reduced incentives to engage in help-seeking behaviour in the present. Our results 
are important, not only for the affected cohort but also for the next generation which may be exposed to longer and 
more intense periods of violence in the household as a result of the drop in reporting behaviour.  
2. The Spanish health care system and the 2012 reform 
Before 2012 Spain was one of just five European Union (EU) countries providing access to more than just emergency 
healthcare for undocumented migrants (Biffl and Altenburg, 2012).
3
 Undocumented migrants could access the 
healthcare system under the same conditions as the native population; the only requirement was the need to be 
registered in a municipality and to apply for a health care card. Registration in a municipality does not require 
evidence of immigration status; the procedure only requires presenting a piece of valid identification (which can be, 
for example, a passport) and some proof of the address in which the individual lives (such as an electricity bill). In 
2012, during the ongoing economic crisis that started in 2008, the central Spanish government passed Royal Decree 
Law (RDL) 16/2012 to ‘guarantee the sustainability’ of the public healthcare system. The law came into effect in 
September 2012 and converted the Spanish National Health Service (Sistema Nacional de Salud, SNS) from a publicly 
funded universal healthcare system to a contribution-based system of social insurance. The new system resulted in the 
exclusion of those who were ‘uninsured’ from accessing healthcare; essentially, those without a residence permit to 
stay in the country. After the reform, health care cards of non-citizens without a residence permit were cancelled 
resulting in the loss of access to the public health system and subsidized treatment drugs for this group. There were 
                                               
3 EU Countries providing more than minimal emergency care include: France, Italy, Portugal, Netherlands and Spain.  
three exceptions to this reform: pregnant women, emergency care for accidents, and children under the age of 18 years 
old.  Reports from the government state that by 2013, one year after the introduction of the reform, 873,000 health care 
cards had been cancelled (Durana and Moreno-Fuentes, 2016).  
Spain is comprised of autonomous cities and communities, hereafter referred to as regions, with a certain degree of 
decentralization of political power.
4
 Regional Health Authorities and governments responded to the central 
government health reform in a multitude of ways. Six regions implemented the law with minimal modifications. In 
contrast, four others organised alternative healthcare programs for irregular migrants to be available from the date 
healthcare reform was implemented, 1st September 2012. Seven more regions arranged alternative measures but 
implemented them at different points in time after the introduction of RDL 16/2012. Eligibility requirements for these 
alternative healthcare programs varied amongst regions. Cimas et al. (2016) provide an in-depth summary of 
alternative regional healthcare programs and eligibility requirements. Although alternative programs were 
implemented in some of the regions, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Spain suggest 
that healthcare access was also restricted in many cases in those regions, for example, the report by Cimas and Gullón 
(2014)
5
. Thus, we cannot reliably use these regions as controls and we will use this variation only to explore the 
intensity of the impact of the reform across regions; we expect the effects to be stronger in regions with stricter 
implementation of the reform. We also expect that the differences across regions will not be substantial due to 
spillover effects of the reform. 
3. Intimate partner violence in Spain 
Foreign-born women in Spain experience a higher incidence of IPV than Spanish women and any physical violence 
they do suffer tends to be more severe. Estimates from the 2015 national, representative, Violence Against Women 
(VAW) survey in Spain show that one quarter of all women over 16 years-old have suffered physical or sexual 
                                               
4
 Decentralisation of powers to the regions is diverse and depends on the region. Provision of health care services is fully decentralised to Regional 
Health Authorities. In contrast, the judicial system is wholly administered by the central government.  
5
 In the appendix section we have copied some examples of individual cases in which access to the health care system was denied. This evidence 
is taken from NGO’s working in Spain and documenting individual cases in order to lobby for the reinstatement of universality in the health care 
system. 
violence at some point in their lifetime (de Miguel Luken, 2015).
6
 This lifetime incidence rises to 36% amongst 
women who are immigrants. When asked in the VAW survey, women born abroad report twice as many incidents of 
IPV as Spanish women in the preceding two months (de Miguel Luken, 2015).  
Whilst education level and employment status are somewhat protective against IPV, migrants with high education and 
high income levels still show an increased prevalence compared with Spanish women (Delegación del Gobierno para 
la Violencia de Género, 2012). The level of severity of the violence is also different between native and foreign 
women: in the last VAW survey, 31% of foreign women who report IPV reported severe physical violence compared 
with 17% of Spanish women (de Miguel Luken, 2015). Women born abroad are also more likely to be murdered by an 
intimate partner than Spanish women. In 2016, they accounted for 34% of IPV fatalities while at the same time 
making up just 9.4% of the female population (calculated with data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE)).  
Protection orders are one option for formal reporting that is open to victims of domestic abuse. In Spain, protection 
orders are obtained via civil proceedings which require a lower burden of proof and impose fewer financial and time 
costs on petitioners than criminal proceedings (Logan et al., 2006). Applications for protection orders in Spain can be 
submitted directly to the court of gender violence by petitioners. Although protection orders can be sought on behalf of 
victims, the overwhelming majority (94%) are requested by victims themselves (calculated from INE data). In this 
study, we use the number of applicants for protection orders as a proxy for help seeking behaviour amongst victims of 
IPV.  
Healthcare professionals (HCPs) are some of the most common individuals to whom victims disclose IPV and 
evidence suggests that discussing IPV in medical settings can increase access to IPV services (McCloskey et al., 2006; 
Ansara and Hindin, 2010; Feder et al., 2011). In a European review of healthcare system responses, Spain was 
considered to have the most systematic and standardised approach to interventions for IPV in healthcare settings 
(Bacchus et al., 2012). Spanish doctors are required to report any injuries (or disturbance of physical or psychological 
functioning) to a judge, if they suspect the injury is the result of a crime. Injuries suspected to be due to IPV are 
reported to the court of gender violence and these comprised, on average, 10% of all official reports of IPV during the 
                                               
6 The EU average is that 33% of women have suffered IPV at some point (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2016). For comparison, US 
estimates suggest 7.7% of men have suffered IPV during their lifetime, rising to 15% amongst men who have ever had an intimate relationship 
with another man (Tjadan and Thoennes, 2000).  
study period.
7
 Yet, qualitative work undertaken in Spain uncovered significant barriers for healthcare professionals to 
identify and report IPV in healthcare settings. Over 80% of healthcare professionals interviewed did not consider IPV 
to be a healthcare issue and just one quarter of nursing and medical professionals reported feeling prepared for dealing 
with IPV (Coll-Vinent et al., 2008).  
4. Human capital and theories of intimate partner violence 
Economic theory of domestic violence has often been based on the paradigm that violence is perpetrated for expressive 
or instrumental purposes. In the former, the perpetrator gains direct utility from abuse and in the latter, indirect utility 
is gained from controlling the victim. There is scant economic theory or evidence looking at IPV from the victim’s 
perspective and her incentives to seek help or leave an abusive relationship.  
Economic theoreticists classically model domestic violence as sequential non-cooperative household bargaining games 
conducted by rational actors (Tauchen, Witte and Long, 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997). These models assume 
that one partner accepts a certain level of violence in exchange for an intra-couple transfer. A threshold is assumed to 
exist over which violence will not be accepted and the victim will leave. The hypothesised threshold implies that 
women must have options available to them outside of abusive relationships for the threat to leave to be credible. The 
endogeneity of key factors, such as a woman’s education and employment in her choice of threshold, has only recently 
been investigated (Aizer, 2010; Alonso-Borrego and Carrasco, 2017).  
Education, employment (and income) are key investment inputs to human capital and appear to be protective against 
IPV (Aizer, 2010; Anderberg et al., 2015; Alonso-Borrego and Carrasco, 2017). Other theoretical work suggests that it 
is not just employment status or income per se that determines the risk of experiencing IPV, but the victim’s economic 
independence. Anderberg and Rainer (2015) present an alternative model of instrumental IPV based on economic 
abuse. They suggest that aggressors seek to undermine the victim’s economic independence by interrupting, 
preventing or sabotaging education and, or employment. While there is no empirical evidence directly testing this 
theory, Browne et al. (1999) found that low-income women with recent experience of physical IPV had 1/3 the odds of 
                                               
7 Calculated from MSSI data available from http://estadisticasviolenciagenero.msssi.gob.es/ last accessed 6th August 2018. The other reports or 
‘denuncias’ come from victims, their families, the police, and domestic violence assistance services. 
maintaining substantial employment compared to women without. It is the ability to invest sufficient time in the work 
place, not just employment, that facilitates “true economic independence” (Browne, Salomon and Bassuk, 1999). We 
consider this true economic independence to contribute to human capital. 
We explore IPV from the perspective of the victim and her incentives to seek help, which few economists have 
addressed. Kingsnorth and Macintosh (2004) apply Rational Choice Theory to help-seeking but provide no empirical 
evidence. Liang et al. (2005) model the decision to leave an abusive partner from a psychological perspective. They 
suggest a linear process by which help-seeing progresses from informal disclosure to friends and relatives, to formally 
reporting and, eventually, leaving the relationship. However, this model does not address the often-cyclical nature of 
such decisions. Aizer and Dal Bó (2009) address this cyclicality. They demonstrate that women use commitment 
devices to support their decision to seek help or leave an abusive relationship, providing evidence that decisions to 
seek help are time inconsistent. We apply human capital theory, as set out by Grossman and developed by Becker, to 
help-seeking behaviour in IPV. Grossman suggested demand for health and healthcare could be modelled with health 
as an investment stock over the life cycle (Grossman, 1972) whereas Becker (2007) specifically addressed the role of 
health behaviours. He theorised that those with higher human capital and longer expected survival, were more likely to 
invest in costly present actions, such as exercise or refraining from smoking, because expected future gains are higher 
than those with lower human capital. Jones et al. (2018) recently proposed a model integrating Grossman’s investment 
model with the Becker-Murphy theory of addiction. The authors model negative health behaviours, such as smoking, 
and positive investments in health capital as simultaneous choices within one optimisation problem. This suggests that 
a rational person considers both the impact of their behaviour and their investments in health capital when making 
decisions or choices.  
We hypothesise that an unanticipated change in access to healthcare will reduce the value of expected future health 
and reduce incentives to seek-help for IPV in the present. Seeking help for IPV is a costly action; women who 
experience IPV commonly cite fear of worsening violence, losing their children, or losing their homes as reasons 
preventing them from seeking help (Fugate Leslie Landis et al., 2005; Sanders, 2015). In contrast to strictly 
endogenous inputs to human capital, such as education, withdrawal of access to healthcare can occur exogenously and 
rapidly, due to a financial shock, loss of health insurance, or a change in public policy.  
We build on previous empirical work including Papageorge et al. (2016) who use a DiD method to show that a 
medical innovation in the treatment of HIV (Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy, HAART) led to a reduction in 
negative behaviours, such as drug taking, amongst women and a reduction in the incidents of domestic violence they 
suffered. More recently, Lee (2018) used a regression discontinuity model to show a causal link between increased 
access to healthcare for dependants up to 26 years old, under the Affordable Care Act, and a reduction in negative 
behaviours (smoking and drinking) in this group. To date, no studies have demonstrated the converse relationship i.e. 
that withdrawal of access to healthcare reduces incentives for positive behaviours that are costly, e.g. quitting 
smoking. We use a fixed-effects DiD analysis to provide causal evidence for the effect of restricting access to 
healthcare on help-seeking behaviour of women who experience IPV.   
5. Data collection and Methodology  
5.1 Data  
We gather data from several administrative sources; the National Institute of Statistics (Insituto Nacional de 
Estadistica, INE), the Judicial Branch of the Spanish government (Poder Judicial, PJ), the Ministry for Health, Social 
Services and Equality (Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicos Sociales e Igualdad, MSSSI) and its inter-departmental 
subsidiary the National Observatory on Violence Against Women. We use the quarterly statistical reports of the 
number of victims with applications for protection orders for both Spanish and non-Spanish (foreign) citizens
8
 from PJ 
to construct a panel dataset for each of the 17 regions (Autonomous Communities) in Spain from 2009 quarter 1 
(2009q1) to 2016 quarter 4 (2016q4).
9
 During this period, the total annual number of applications for protection orders 
was, on average, 27.4% of the total annual number of formal reports of IPV. This proportion remained stable over 
time, despite annual variation in the number of formal reports. Data from PJ shows that nationally, 95% of applicants 
                                               
8
 Those with dual nationality are counted as Spanish citizens in this data. We exclude data from Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish, North African 
autonomous cities. 
9
 Quarterly judicial data reports available from PJ: http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/en/Subjects/Domestic-and-gender-violence/Activity-of-the-
Observatory/Statistic-Data/ last accessed 18th January 2018. 




Unfortunately, reports from the PJ do not distinguish between foreign women with and without Spanish residency, 
therefore we do not have information on what proportion of the foreign (non-citizen) women in our data are 
undocumented. Furthermore, determining the number of irregular migrants in a country is an exceptionally difficult 
task. Using data from 2005, González-Enriquez (2008) estimated that 15% of all third country (non-EU) nationals in 
Spain were undocumented, representing approximately 1.5% of the total population.11 Potential ‘noise’ from 
regularised migrants in the ‘foreign’ group in our data could mask the effect of the health policy on irregular migrants.
 
To evaluate the importance of this ‘noise’ in our analysis, we construct a second dataset that describes the proportion 
of women with protection orders by continent of birth, using annual data available from INE between 2011 – 2016 
(Table 1).12 On average 14% of the female population in Spain between 2011-2016 were born elsewhere. Of these, 
90% were from the Americas and Caribbean, EU, or Africa.13 
From González-Enriquez (2008) we also know that most undocumented immigrants are from Latin America (47%) 
with Europeans comprising 26% and Africans 20%. African women appear to be under-represented in official 
population statistics (first column, Table 1) compared with the estimates from Gonzalez-Enriquez, suggesting they are 
more likely to be undocumented than women from other continents (Table 1). In contrast, female EU citizens are over 
represented in official statistics as they are much less likely to be undocumented. Though the proportion of the 
undocumented population is estimated by González-Enriquez with a high level of uncertainty, the proportions are 
remarkably similar to those of women experiencing domestic violence by continent of origin presented in the second 
column of Table 1.  
                                               
10
 Data available from PJ: http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/en/Subjects/Domestic-and-gender-violence/Activity-of-the-Observatory/Statistic-
Data/La-violencia-sobre-la-mujer-en-la-estadistica-judicial--Anual-2016 spreadsheet Violencia sobre la Mujer por Provincias – Año 2016, last 
accessed 4th November 2018.  
11
 Clandestino, an EU funded a research project, was set up to estimate the number of irregular migrants in 12 individual EU countries. Since its 
termination in 2009, estimates are updated by collaborators on an ad hoc basis. More information is available from  http://irregular-migration.net/  
12
 Data last access 15/09/17 and available from: 
http://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/en/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736176866&menu=resultados&idp=1254735573206 
13
 ‘The Americas’ here refers to North, Central, and South America, and the Caribbean. 
Furthermore, there is extensive evidence from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) suggesting that there were 
spill over effects of the reform between regularised and irregular immigrants. Doctors of the World (Medicos del 
Mundo, MDM) claim that the reform was a big shock for all migrants and that its implementation was done in a 
stricter way than what was intended by the law: in particular, they report a significant lack of knowledge about rights 
to access healthcare amongst migrants both with and without residence permits after the reform (Medicos del Mundo, 
2015). In the same report, the NGO found that some immigrants in protected patient categories (e.g. pregnant women 
or asylum seekers) had been refused treatment though they were entitled to free treatment. Furthermore, they also 
describe a number of legal immigrants in Spain who were denied access to the health care system after the reform. 
There are three examples of these particular cases in the Appendix section (one of them on gender violence) that we 
have taken from two reports of an organization (REDER)
14
 working in Spain to collect information on individuals 
affected by the healthcare reform. These reports imply a lack of knowledge of the process amongst both immigrants 
and healthcare administrative staff, which suggests that implementation of the reform was more intense than what was 
envisaged in the law.  
Covariate data were retrieved from INE. The economic crisis officially began in Spain in the third quarter of 2008 
(four years before the policy); we include the quarterly female unemployment rate by binary nationality (Spanish and 
foreign) at the regional level in order to control for local labour market conditions and its potential impact on help 
seeking behaviour after IPV.
 
Similarly, population estimates at the regional level by binary nationality were included 
to control for population changes between regions.
  
Table 2 provides a description of these variables for both Spanish 
and foreign women at the regional level. Although Spanish women account for twice as many applicants for protection 
orders as foreign women, when the rate of applicants per 10,000 population is calculated, proportionally more foreign 
women apply for protection orders than Spanish women.  
 
  5.2. Econometric Strategy 
To determine a causal relationship between withdrawal of access to healthcare and reduced help-seeking behaviour we 
use a fixed effects differences-in-differences (DiD) model. As DiD models rely on the common trends assumption, in 
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 REDER (Red de Denuncia Y Resistencia al RDL 16/2012) is a multi-agency collective of over 300 social and professional organisations 
including the Spanish Association of Family and Community Medicine and Doctors of the World.  
Figure 1 we plot the evolution of the log number of applicants for protection orders in Spain between the first quarter 
of 2009 and the fourth quarter of 2016, distinguishing between Spanish and foreign applicants.  Looking at Figure 1 
we can see that trends in Spanish and foreign applicants for protection orders appear to be similar pre-2012. There is a 
decreasing trend in applicants for protection orders, but this drop follows a parallel trend in the two groups. Once the 
reform is introduced there is a sharp drop in the number of foreign applicants for protection orders and, even though 
the trends continue to follow a similar path in the two groups after the reform, foreign applicants remain at much lower 
levels after the reform, relative to their pre-2012 levels and to Spanish women. 
We estimate the following fixed effects DiD model: 
                                                                                    (1) 
where             is the logarithm of number of applicants for protection orders in region i, for year y and quarter q, 
and f denotes binary nationality.    is the foreign dummy and acts as the treatment indicator variable. It takes the value 
1 for foreign applicants and zero for Spanish.    is the year specific dummy for all years 2009 – 2016.    is the quarter 
specific dummy for all q, where q = [1, 2, 3, 4] and controls for seasonal variation in intimate partner violence and 
help seeking behaviour due to changes in weather, holidays, and calendar events e.g. the football season.
15
    is the 
region-specific dummy where i = [1, …, 17] for each of the regions of Spain.        is a dummy marking the 
introduction of reform and equals 1 for post-treatment periods. The health reform law was enacted in April 2012 and 
implemented on 1
st 
September 2012 so that quarter four 2012 is the first treated period. Thus,            is the 
interaction term between the foreign and post treatment dummies. Its coefficient,    , is the DiD estimator for the 
effect of withdrawing healthcare on foreign women applying for protection orders. To control for changes in 
population over time, the log regional population by binary nationality (           ) is included.
16
 We include the 
regional female unemployment rate by binary nationality (         ) to control for the impact of local labour market 
conditions on help-seeking behaviour of Spanish and foreign women. Standard errors are clustered at the regional 
                                               
15  Card and Dahl (2011) showed that emotional cues such as the local team unexpectedly losing a football match can “place women at higher risk 
of abuse.” 
16
 Population numbers are published semi-annually and were applied to both quarters in a semester e.g. quarter 1 and quarter 2 both use semester 1 
population data.  
level by wild-bootstrap procedure to account for a small number of clusters, 17. In some specifications, we also 
include a region-specific linear trend to account for any linear changes over time that can influence help-seeking 
behaviour of women differently across regions. As some social policies are determined at the regional level, any 
change in these policies during our sample period in a specific region that may affect help-seeking behaviour in that 
region will be captured by the region-specific linear trends. 
We present a second specification using a Weighted Ordinary Least Squares (WOLS) model, weighted by inverse 
population variance, to estimate the effect in natural units. Greater weight is given to more populous regions, 
improving the precision of the estimate. In the WOLS model, the dependent variable is number of applicants per 
10,000 female population by binary nationality. As the population is the weighting variable, it is not therefore included 
as a regressor; all other regressors are the same as equation (1).  
To reveal the timing and intensity of the effect of treatment we conduct an event study at the national level over 32 
quarters; 16 of both lead and lag quarters. Event studies constitute an empirical test of the validity of the common 
trends assumption in the pre-treatment period. The number of lead and lag periods are balanced and standard errors are 
bootstrapped and clustered on region.  
Event Study estimates are derived from a regression of the form:   
                                              (2) 
where,            is the natural logarithm of number of applicants for protection orders. As before f and i denote 
binary nationality and region. t denotes period (i.e. year and quarter) where t = [1-n, …, 0, …, n] and n is the number 
of lead/lag periods. t=0 corresponds to the period the law was implemented.   ,   , and            are as before.    is a 
period specific dummy for 1-n lead periods, the period the law was implement (t=0), and n lag periods.
17
 The 
remaining term       is the interaction term between the foreign dummy and the period specific dummies (where t = 
[1-n, …, 0, …, n]). The coefficients on these terms    describe any difference in log number of foreign applicants for 
                                               
17
 The first lead period is removed to avoid multicollinearity.  
protection orders relative to Spanish applicants for each period t = [1-n, …, 0, …, n] compared with period t = -n (i.e. 
2009q1).  
6. Results 
The results for both Log and WOLS specifications of equation (1) are presented in Table 3. The estimates of the 
coefficient on the interaction term between the foreign and post dummies are the DiD estimates. From the log 
specification (Table 3, column 2), we estimate that foreign applicants for protection orders were reduced by 15.6% 
after access to healthcare was restricted.
18
 Alternatively, the estimated reduction in natural units is 1.6 applicants per 
10,000 foreign women from the WOLS specification (Table 3, column 1).
19
 Both estimates are statistically significant 
and are consistent with a human capital theory perspective on help-seeking behaviour in IPV. The coefficient is 
effectively unchanged by adding regional specific linear trends (RSLT), (Table 3, column 3).  
In the log specification (Table 3, column 2) we see that the population elasticity of help-seeking, measured by number 
of applicants for protection orders, is 0.5 and is highly significant. This indicates that a 1% increase in population will 
lead to 0.5% increase in formal help-seeking behaviour and suggests that women are more likely to apply for 
protection orders in more populous areas. This may be due to a higher level of intimate partner violence in populated 
areas, better provision of specialist services in more populous areas, and/or a greater cost to seeking formal help in 
smaller communities, both financially and in terms of availability of outside options.  
Evidence from the 2015 VAW survey suggests that all the above are true. The survey authors report that fewer women 
suffer physical violence in small municipalities (fewer than 2,000 inhabitants) compared with women in more 
populous municipalities. They find that a lower percentage of women who do experience IPV make formal reports to 
the police or courts in smaller municipalities and a higher proportion of these women seek help from other sources 
such as healthcare or social services than women in municipalities larger than 10,000 people (de Miguel Luken, 2015).  
                                               
18
 We use Kennedy’s method to obtain the percentage change in y, the dependent variable, in a semi-log specification with dummy variable D 
where              , if D changes from 0 to 1, e.g. from Spanish to foreign, then  




      (Kennedy, 1981) which has been shown to be almost unbiased by Giles (2011). 
19
An estimated reduction of 1.6 foreign applicants/10,000 foreign women is 10.6% of the pre-treatment mean of 15.98 (CI: 4.966– 26.99) foreign 
applicants/10,000 foreign women. This falls just outside the 95% confidence interval of estimate from the log transformation specification (CI: -
19.7% - -11.3%).  
Although the coefficient for female unemployment rate is positive (which is not in keeping with human capital theory 
or the bargaining model), it is significant only in some of the specifications and must be interpreted with caution as, in 
our regressions, it is used as a control for general business cycle conditions at the regional level. Furthermore, the 
empirical evidence shows a somewhat complex relationship between female employment and IPV and recent research 
suggests that relative wage within a couple and not just employment status influences the incidence of IPV (Aizer, 
2010; Alonso-Borrego and Carrasco, 2017).  
We then exploit differences across regions in Spain according to the intensity with which the law was implemented. 
As mentioned before, regions in Spain have a certain degree of autonomy with respect to some policies. Cimas et al. 
(2016) have reviewed regional implementation of the restrictions in health care access for undocumented migrants; in 
their paper, the authors rate each of the 17 regions in Spain according to these restrictions.
20
 We ranked regions by the 
date on which an alternative healthcare provision was implemented (if any) and an intensity of treatment score, 
derived from Cimas et al.’s (2016) access to health score (Table 4), and perform a sub-group analysis by intensity of 
treatment at the regional level. The four regions with a comprehensive alternative program implemented 
simultaneously with the healthcare reform are considered to have low treatment intensity. The six regions with 
minimal or no changes to the national law are considered to have high treatment intensity. The remaining seven 
regions introduced alternative programs after the law was implemented, creating still more heterogeneity and so are 
not analysed because it is difficult to assess the degree of implementation of the national law in those regions.  
As explained above and shown in the appendix section, there is anecdotal evidence collected by several NGOs and 
other organizations in Spain reporting the existence of restrictions in access to the health care system even in regions 
that implemented an alternative program to provide health coverage for undocumented migrants. The reform changed 
the nature of the public health care system and its implementation was experienced throughout the entire country, 
according to the reports issued by NGOs working in the field. Therefore, we use only the most extreme regions with 
respect to treatment intensity. 
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 Cimas et al. (2016) devised their score using 8 criteria: Formal definition of alternative procedures for access to healthcare, Administration 
requirements i.e. how many documents are required to acquire a health card (low vs high), groups of patients covered by healthcare, medical care 
services included in any new arrangement, coverage of out-of-pocket payments,  medical history included in general patient database to facilitate 
ongoing care, diseases of public health relevance included, chronic disease, major mental disorder.  
 
We see in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 that, indeed, the effect of the policy increases with treatment intensity. For the 
highest treatment intensity regions, the policy caused a 19.3% reduction in foreign applicants for protection orders 
relative to Spanish (Table 3, column 4). The effect magnitude was smaller and statistically insignificant for the lowest 
treatment intensity regions where there was an estimated 7.5% reduction (Table 3, column 5).  
We perform a second analysis in Table 5 where we use the treatment intensity score as a continuous variable so that 
regions with the most intense treatment score 100 and the least intense regions score 0 (Table 4 describes scores for 
each region). In the first column of Table 5 we estimate the same model as equation 1 using intensity score (a 
continuous variable) as a treatment variable, instead of the foreign dummy. We can see that the coefficient of the 
interaction of the continuous treatment variable with the post reform indicator is negative and significant, indicating 
stronger decreases in applicants for protection orders in regions more intensively treated by the health care restrictions. 
In the second and third columns of Table 5 we perform the same exercise with log and WOLS specifications using 
foreign women only, comparing the IPV reports of foreign women in more and less intensively treated regions. In the 
log specification (Table 5, column 2) we can see there is a significant reduction in foreign applicants for protection 
orders for a unitary increase in treatment intensity score after the policy was introduced. Using the WOLS model to 
derive a natural unit estimation of effect, we find there are 0.05 fewer foreign applicants for protection orders per 
10,000 female population for each unit increase in treatment score (Table 5, column 3). This equates to 5 fewer foreign 
applicants per 10,000 population in regions with the most restrictive health policy, for example, Castilla-La-Mancha, 
compared with foreigners in regions which officially have full healthcare access, such as Navarra. This result supports 
the causal link between intensity of treatment and the reduction in help-seeking behaviour suggested in the main 
results.   
One of the main threats to our identification strategy is the potential incentive to leave the country as a result of the 
reform. Exclusion from accessing the public health care system may affect the migration decision of those 
undocumented migrants living in Spain. Thus, there could be changes in the underlying population of undocumented 
migrants staying in the country that could be driving our results. In our main specifications in Table 3 we already 
control for the underlying population at risk of suffering IPV and the results of the reform are significant even after 
including population as a control. However, there could still be selection in migration patterns that could jeopardize 
our findings if those women suffering from IPV become more likely to migrate after the reform, which could be partly 
driving to the drop in IPV reports observed in our data. In order to address this concern, we classify regions by pattern 
of migration and identify regions with stable trends in population between Spanish and foreign women. We perform 
sub group analyses using these regions to isolate the effect of the policy from that of migration. We used event study 
models to identify regions where the difference in migration of foreign and Spanish women was relatively stable over 
time. Three regions were found to have a stable population for the entire duration of the period analysed. A further 
nine regions had stable foreign female populations up to the third quarter after the policy reform was introduced (Table 
6).  
To confirm the migration trends explained above for women in these regions, we perform a DiD analysis similar to 
equation (1) using population as the dependant variable instead. For the group where population declines in the third 
quarter after the policy, we restrict the analysis to 7 periods around the policy implementation (2011q4-2013q2), three 
periods before the law is passed and three periods after. The results in Table 7 show there is no statistically significant 
change in foreign female population in the ‘stable population’ group for the duration of the analysis period; nor is 
there a significant change in foreign female population during the first 3 periods after the policy is introduced in the 
group where population declines in lag quarter 3. This confirms the common trend in migration for these regions.  
Thus, we now repeat the main DiD analysis for change in protection order applicants by sub groups defined by 
migration patterns. In the nine regions where foreign female population declines in the third quarter after the reform, 
we estimate that the health policy causes a 15.4% decrease in foreign applicants for protection orders. This estimate is 
almost identical to the main result of a 15.6% decrease. The magnitude of the fall is much larger in the stable 
population group where the health reform is estimated to cause a 24% decrease in help-seeking behaviour amongst 
foreign women.  
The stronger effect in the stable population group of regions cannot be explained by these regions being more 
intensively treated: all three regions are in the middle of the intensive index distribution and the nine regions in which 
population declines in the third quarter after the reform are a mix between high and low intensity regions. Therefore, 
our results indicate a stronger effect of restrictions in access to health care in regions where foreign women are less 
likely to migrate and are, thus, exposed to the full effects of the reform.   
In Table 8 we evaluate the effect of the reform on migration in both low and high treatment intensity regions. We can 
see that the decline in foreign population relative to Spanish is significant and of similar magnitude in the two types of 
regions even though, as shown in Table 3, there is a larger decrease in IPV reports in high intensity regions as a result 
of the reform. This suggests that migration is not the cause of differential help-seeking behaviour in high and low 
treatment intensity regions, reinforcing our hypothesis that the differential results are explained by differing intensity 
in the application of the policy amongst regions.   
Finally, in order to explore the dynamics of the policy effects as well as to investigate the existence of parallel trends 
in IPV reporting between Spanish and foreign women before the introduction of the policy, we estimate an event study 
model as shown in equation (2). We present the results in (figure 2), which shows that the effects of the health reform 
were immediate and strongly persistent. The estimate for the first quarter after the reform suggests there is a highly 
significant 24.5% reduction in foreign applicants when compared with 2009 quarter one. The effect of the policy 
persists for 4 years after its introduction in 2012. Lead estimates are, on the whole, not significantly different from 
zero. The explanatory power of the lead estimates is jointly zero (F (13, 1025] = 1.38), supporting the assumption of 
parallel trends in IPV reporting between Spanish and foreign females before the introduction of the policy.  
7. Robustness checks  
   7.1. Controlling for male unemployment rates as a proxy indicator for IPV incidence 
In this paper, we focus on the impact of restricted access to healthcare on formal help-seeking behaviour of 
undocumented migrant women who experience IPV. However, we cannot disentangle the extent to which 
the reduction in applicants for protection orders is driven by a change in the incidence of IPV itself. We 
assume that the underlying incidence of IPV is not affected by the reform and, thus, the observed reduction 
is only a result of altered personal weighting of the risks of seeking a protection order and the expected 
future health/human capital among affected women. Due to its hidden nature, the actual incidence of IPV is 
extremely difficult to measure, therefore, we sought an alternative indicator of the underlying rate of abuse 
within couples to test this assumption, 
Two Spanish studies show a strong correlation between male unemployment and the likelihood that a 
woman experiences IPV. Sanz-Barbero et al. (2015) demonstrate a link between long-term male 
unemployment and the risk of suffering IPV. Alonso-Borrego and Carrasco (2017) provide empirical 
evidence from large, representative, Spanish VAW surveys which shows that male employment significantly 
reduces the risk of physical violence within a couple. In contrast, female employment only affects the risk of 
violence when her partner is also employed. Therefore, following the findings of these studies, we assume 
that incidents of IPV increase with male unemployment and use the regional male unemployment rate as a 
proxy variable to control for the underlying rate of IPV. Table 9 presents additional results in which we 
introduce controls for several measures of male unemployment rate while also controlling for female 
unemployment rate. As can be seen in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 9, our baseline results are unchanged 
with the inclusion of controls for the general male unemployment rate, the unemployment rate of foreign 
males, or the unemployment rate of Spanish males, all of them at the regional level. We include all three 
rates as IPV reports from foreign women could potentially be affected by changes in unemployment rates of 
both Spanish and foreign men (as couples do not necessarily sort by nationality). None of the proxies of 
underlying IPV trends affect the magnitude or significance levels of our baseline estimates, suggesting that 
the underlying rate of IPV is not influenced by the healthcare reform.  
   7.2. Controlling for physician behaviour in response to the reform 
Healthcare professionals can provide an important link to specialist domestic violence services. One 
plausible explanation for our results is that applications for protection orders are affected by a change in 
healthcare activity, specifically, a reduction in physician referrals to specialist IPV services. As fewer 
migrant women have access to healthcare after the reform, we assume there will be fewer disclosures of IPV 
to healthcare professionals and fewer referrals to specialist IPV services resulting in a reduction in applicants 
for protection orders. There are no publicly available data detailing referrals from healthcare professionals to 
specialist IPV services. However, there is a legal requirement for doctors to report injuries, physical or 
psychological, suspected to result from IPV to the court of gender violence. These reports constitute 
approximately 10% of all reports to the court, and are distinct from applications for protection orders, our 
dependant variable.
21
 We include the number of quarterly regional injury reports from healthcare 
professionals in our regression to understand whether the effects are being driven by changes in the 
behaviour of medical practitioners or of affected women.
22
 In column 5 of Table 9 we can see that 
controlling for the log number of injury reports does not change the size or significance level of our baseline 
results. This implies that the healthcare reform did not alter physician behaviour with regards to reporting 
IPV and is therefore unlikely to have affected referrals to specialist IPV services.  
Thus, we conclude that the observed drop in protection order applications is mostly driven by a change in 
decisions about seeking help among migrant victims of IPV rather than by underlying changes in the 
incidence of IPV events (perpetrator behaviour) or changes in the behaviour of physicians. Therefore, even if 
overall IPV events do not change (as proxied by male unemployment rates), the reporting behaviour of 
foreign women does change as a result of the reform.      
7.3. Changing the geographical level of observations: Provincial level results 
To investigate whether our results are robust to the level of geographical aggregation, we present the results 
of both the DiD regression (1) and event study (2) models using data aggregated at the provincial level 
instead of regional level (autonomous community). There are 52 provinces in Spain divided amongst 17 
regions. In the provincial level analysis, standard errors are clustered at the province level. Regrettably, 
information on female unemployment rates is not available separately for foreign and Spanish women at the 
province level and so we control for total female unemployment rate. In the first column of Table 10 we can 
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Injury reports are not a perfect measure of physician activity in response to the reform as they include reports from emergency 
and obstetric physicians and emergency services were ostensibly unaffected by the restriction in access to healthcare. However, we 
know from NGOs that restriction of access spilled-over into these clinical areas in some instances.  
22
 Injury reports are not available by nationality, therefore, we include the total number of quarterly injury reports in each region 
without distinguishing by foreign and Spanish nationals. 
see that the results are extremely similar to the regressions at the regional level: province level results show a 
drop in IPV reports by 17% as a result of the policy while baseline results at the regional level show a drop 
by 15.6%. Though the similarity in these two estimates provides evidence of the robustness of our findings, 
we believe that regional level results are the most robust. Aggregating to the regional level is logical given 
the policy is applied at this level and allows us to control for regional trends in other policies or regional 
variables. It also allows us to better control for the impact of female unemployment given that differential 
female unemployment rates by binary nationality are only available for regions.  
 
7.4. Placebo regression 
For our final robustness check, we present a placebo regression to support the validity of the difference in 
difference method and test the common trend assumption in the pre-treatment period (Jones and Rice, 2011). 
If the common trend assumption holds, at least for the pre-treatment period, the DiD estimator should not be 
significant for a “placebo law”. The placebo regression (Table 10, column 2) shows a statistically 




8. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we exploit a policy reform introduced in Spain in 2012, which restricted access to the health care 
system for undocumented immigrants, to provide empirical evidence for a causal relationship between access 
to healthcare and help-seeking behaviour amongst women who experience domestic violence. Applying 
human capital theory, we argue that reduced access to healthcare leads to a reduction in the expected value of 
future health and human capital and thus decreases incentives for victims of IPV to seek help in the present.   
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 We chose the placebo policy to take place in 2010q3 because it allows for a balanced number of lead and lag periods. However, most lead 
periods show an insignificant reduction in log number of foreign applicants relative to 2009q1. 
We construct a rich panel of IPV reports from the judiciary system for foreign and Spanish women at the 
regional and quarterly level. The panel includes 16 periods before and after the implementation of the reform 
which allows us to estimate differences-in-differences models. We show that foreign applicants for protection 
orders fell by almost 16%, compared with Spanish, after access to healthcare was withdrawn for 
undocumented immigrants due to the 2012 law. Event study models reveal that the effect of the policy is 
large, immediate and persistent. We demonstrate that the observed effect increases with intensity of treatment 
and persists after accounting for several factors such as population migration patterns, the underlying 
incidence of IPV, and physician behaviour in identifying and reporting cases of IPV.  
Our work is especially relevant to inform current discussions on the impacts of immigration policies. In many 
countries there has been a surge in the inflow of undocumented migrants (as shown by the refugee crisis in 
Europe and the increasing numbers of undocumented individuals in the USA) and fear about the potentially 
negative consequences of immigration has spread over the resident population. In turn, this has prompted 
many policy makers to consider the introduction of policies that limit the access to several public programs 
and public benefits for the immigrant population. Our paper provides evidence on the negative public health 
consequences of some of these limitations. Apart from the population directly affected by the reform, policy 
makers should also consider the intergenerational effects of such policies and the potential for crossover 
effects on native and regularised populations. Pollak (2004) suggests that the intergenerational transmission of 
abusive behaviour (and victimisation) in a “cycle of violence” compounds the impact of any policy that 
affects IPV.  
We contribute to the new literature of economic theory of domestic violence by investigating factors that 
impact women’s decisions to seek help for IPV. Education, income and employment of a woman who 
experiences IPV have traditionally been considered exogenous to her ‘threshold’ for leaving in Bargaining 
Theory of IPV. We use a natural experiment to show that access to healthcare is an important factor in the 
decision to seek-help for IPV. A better understanding of victims’ motivation to seek help and barriers to help 
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Table 1. Foreign women in Spain as a proportion of the foreign population and foreign victims of IPV   
 
Origin by Continent 
Proportion of female 
foreign population 
Proportion of female 
foreign IPV victims 
Proportion of 
undocumented migrant 




0.432 0.422 0.47 
[0.003] [0.025]  
 
0.428 - 0.435 0.396 - 0.449  
   
 
Europe non-EU 0.337 0.295 0.26 
 
[0.008] [0.012] (EU and non-EU) 
 
0.328 - 0.345 0.282 - 0.307  
   
 
Africa 0.128 0.208 0.20 
 
[0.002] [0.019]  
 
0.125 - 0.130 0.188 - 0.228  
   
 
Rest of the world 
  
0.104 0.075 0.07 
[0.006] [0.012]  
0.098 - 0.110 0.063 - 0.088  
 
Note: Foreign women by continent of origin presented as a proportion of: the female foreign population, female foreign victims of IPV and the 
undocumented migrant population 2011- 2016. Reported as mean annual proportion [SE] 95% Confidence Intervals. Columns 1 &2 are calculated 
using annual, national data from INE for both the female population and proportion of female victims with protection orders or ‘precautionary 
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 Data available from Clandestino website http://irregular-
migration.net/typo3_upload/groups/31/3.Database_on_IrregMig/3.2.Stock_Tables/Spain_Estimates_IrregularMigration_Nov09_2.pdf last 
accessed 18th April 2018.  





























Note: Descriptive statistics for dependent (number applicants for protection orders by, its log, and number of applicants/10,0000 women by binary 
nationality) and independent variables (female population by binary nationality, its log, and female unemployment rate) used in the main analysis 
by binary nationality (Spanish and foreign) at the regional (autonomous community) level. Note: dual citizens are considered to be Spanish for the 
purpose of this analysis.
VARIABLES Mean SD Min Max 
Spanish     
Applicants 355.1 (355.5) 14 1731 
Applicants/ 10,000 women 3.348 (1.342) 1.166 8.450 
Ln(applicants) 5.373 (1.050) 2.639 7.456 
Female population 1,008,493 (876,305) 114,040 3,114,135 
Ln(female population) 13.45 (0.890) 11.64 14.95 
Female unemployment rate 20.15 (7.071) 8.010 38.98 
    
Observations 544    
Foreign     
Applicants 165.3 (181.3) 5 887 
Applicants/ 10,000 women 15.98 (5.619) 2.167 34.58 
Ln(applicants) 4.554 (1.071) 1.609 6.788 
Female population 113,771 (122,849) 12,354 421,265 
Ln(female population) 11.06 (1.109) 9.422 12.95 
Female unemployment rate 32.05 (8.508) 5.430 68.15 
    
Observations 544    
Table 3. Difference-in-differences estimates 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 WOLS  Log Log with RSLT Higher intensity Lower intensity Stable 
population 





                 
Foreign dummy 10.95***  0.428 0.446 0.190 0.742 -1.111*** -1.122*** 
 (0.000)  (0.370) (0.368) (0.538) (0.649) (0.354) (0.354) 
Post-treatment dummy -0.0567  0.0361 0.0366 0.0726 0.00314 0.0680 -0.0893** 
 (0.168)  (0.0347) (0.0333) (0.0792) (0.0101) (0.0867) (0.0390) 
Foreign*post interaction -1.653** 
 
-0.168*** -0.166*** -0.212*** -0.0742 -0.271*** -0.166*** 
 (0.671)  (0.0541) (0.0536) (0.0682) (0.0809) (0.0865) (0.0524) 
ln(female population)   0.550*** 0.551*** 0.276 0.589***   
   (0.200) (0.191) (0.343) (0.000)   
Female UR 0.0834  0.0134** 0.0120* -0.000513 0.000955 0.0102 0.0253 
 (0.0801)  (0.00646) (0.00648) (0.00434) (0.00258) (0.0148) (0.0154) 
         
Estimated % change
†    -15.6%*** -15.4%*** -19.3%*** -7.5% -24.0%*** -15.4%*** 
         
Observations 1,088  1,088 1,088 384 256 192 126 
Adjusted r2 0.867  0.949 0.953 0.948 0.968 0.851 0.971 
Region Specific Linear Trend No  No Yes No No No No 
         
Regression timespan 2009q1 - 
2016q4 
 2009q1 - 
2016q4 






         
Number of Regions 17  17 17 6 4 3 9 
Note: DiD regression results describing the effect of the law on help-seeking behaviour of victims of IPV, as measured by number of applicants for protection orders. Specifications: Column 1 
shows weighted ordinary least squares (WOLS) model; Column 2 shows the log specification; Column 3 presents the log specification with region specific linear trends (RSLT); Column 4 
shows the DiD regression for the 6 highest treatment intensity regions (Madrid, Balearic Islands, Murica, Rioja, Castilla and Leon, and Castilla La Mancha); Column 5 shows the same for the 4 
lowest treatment intensity regions (Asturias, Catalonia, Galicia, and The Basque Country); Column 6, shows results using only the 3 regions (Aragon, Extremadura, and The Canary Islands) 
where the population of foreign women was shown to be stable for the period 2009-2016. Finally, in column 7, we report the results of the analysis using only the 6 regions (The Balearic 
Islands, Valencia, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, Andalusia) where the population of foreign women is stable until the third quarter after the policy was introduced. Results here are reported for a 
seven-period window around the introduction of the reform 2011q4-2013q2. The difference in differences estimator is the co-efficient on the interaction between the foreign and post reform 
dummies. † The estimated change in effect is calculated using Kennedy’s correction for estimating effect size using dummy variables in semi-logarithmic models. Wild bootstrapped standard 
errors (SEs) clustered on region are in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
 




























s 1 Asturias 01/09/2012 22.5 
2 Catalonia 01/09/2012 30.5 
3 Galicia 31/08/2012 31.5 
4 Basque Country 01/07/2012 35.5 
 5 Navarra 25/02/2013 0 
 6 Aragon 19/03/2013 32.5 
 7 Andalucia 06/06/2013 19.5 
 8 Extremadura 15/07/2013 33.5 
 9 Valencia 31/07/2013 29.5 
 10 Canary Islands 16/08/2013 31.5 



















12 Madrid - 60 
13 Balearic Islands - 71 
14 Murcia - 90 
15 Rioja - 100 
16 Castilla y Leon - 100 
17 Castilla La Mancha - 100 
 
Note: Regions ranked by the date alternative provision of healthcare for undocumented migrants was made available and intensity of treatment 
score, derived from Cimas at al. (2016). If alternative provision was provided after the law was introduced, regions are ranked first by date of 
alternative program introduction, then treatment intensity score.  
Notes: 1=least intensely treatment region, 17=most intensely treated region at time reform implemented. Cimas at al. (2016) score regions out of 
a total of 100 based on their access to healthcare for undocumented migrants and any additional requirements such as documentation. We take 
the inverse, 100 – (access to care score) = intensity of treatment score. The most intensely treated regions implemented the central government 









Table 5. Difference-in-differences estimates using intensity of treatment score 
Note: DiD regression results describing the effect of treatment intensity on help-seeking behaviour as measured by number of applicants for 
protection orders. The DiD estimator is the co-efficient of the interaction of the post reform dummy and continuous treatment intensity score listed 
in Table 4. Column 1 shows the specification with log number of female applicants for protection orders by binary nationality (Spanish and 
foreign) as the dependent variable. Column 2 presents the same model using only data for foreign women. The weighted ordinary least squares 
(WOLS) model with foreign female applicants for protection orders per 10,000 foreign women as the dependent variable. Wild bootstrapped 
standard errors (SEs) clustered on region are in parenthesis, Statistical significance is denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Spanish and foreign Foreign only Foreign only 
 Log with intensity 






      
Post-treatment dummy 0.0637 0.131 1.965*** 
 (0.0539) (0.105) (0.000) 
 
   ln(female population) 0.417*** 0.198 -8.382 
 (0.000) (0.462) (10.80) 
Female UR 0.0133*** -0.00219 -0.0118 
 (0.00463) (0.00262) (0.0329) 
Treatment intensity score 0.00688*** -0.00403 0.0759 
 (0.000) (0.00288) (0.115) 
Post*Intensity score interaction 
-0.00231*** -0.00363*** -0.0529*** 
(0.000894) (0.00117) (0.0170) 
 
   Observations 1,088 544 544 
Adjusted r2 0.947 0.953 0.713 
    
 
Table 6. Regions grouped by migration pattern. 
 
 
Note: Regions are categorised by migration of female foreigners, relative to Spanish women, based on event studies looking at changes in female 
population over time. The foreign female population is considered to be stable if there is no evidence of differential migration patterns between 
foreign and Spanish women over the study period. In 8 regions, the foreign female population declines, relative to the Spanish population, before 
the reform is introduced and in the remaining 6 regions, a decline in the foreign female population is seen after 2013q3, the third quarter after the 
reform was introduced. Note: these categories contain different groups of regions from the high and low treatment intensity regions described in 
Table 4.
Migration Pattern Regions 
Foreign female population declines 
before the policy 
Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla Y Leon, Castilla La Mancha, Catalonia, 
Galicia, Basque Country, Rioja 
Foreign female population declines 
after the policy 
Balearic Islands, Valencia, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, Andalucia 
Stable foreign female population Aragon, Extremadura, Las Canarias 
Table 7. Difference-in-differences estimates for changes in migration. 
 
Note: DiD regression results describing the effect of the health reform on female migration. The DiD estimator is the co-efficient of the interaction 
of the foreign and post reform dummies. Column 1 shows the change in foreign female population, relative to Spanish, weighted by inverse 
population weights for all regions for the entire study period. Column 2 presents the same using log population as the dependent variable. In 
column 3, regional specific linear trends are added to the log specification of column 2. In column 4, the regression is restricted to regions with 
stable population and finally in column 5, the regression is restricted to a seven-period window around the time the policy was implemented those 
regions where the female foreign population declines in the third quarter after the reform. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on region are in 
parentheses. Region specific dummies, year dummies and quarter dummies are included for each regression. Statistical significance is denoted by * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. †Calculated using Kennedy’s correction for estimating effect size using dummy variables in semi-logarithmic 
models. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Weighted 









            
Foreign dummy -1.773e+06*** -2.227*** -2.220*** -2.312*** -2.673*** 
 
(572,413) (0.719) (0.717) (0.737) (0.844) 
Post-treatment dummy 
-33,238 0.0531*** 0.0533*** -0.0485 -0.0137 
 
(55,587) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0695) (0.0317) 
Foreign*post 
interaction -45,619 -0.0889*** -0.0883*** 0.00278 -0.0110 
 
(37,819) (0.0287) (0.0285) (0.00742) (0.00817) 
Female UR 20,811 -0.0100 -0.0107 -0.0151*** 0.00470 
 
(27,661) (0.00672) (0.00737) (0.00482) (0.0128) 
      Estimated % change† 
 
-8.5%*** -8.5%*** 0.3% -1.1% 
      Observations 1,088 1,088 1,088 192 126 
Adjusted r2 0.945 0.965 0.965 0.941 0.982 
Region Specific Linear 
Trend No No Yes No No 





Number of Regions 17 17 17 3 9 




















Note: DiD regression results describing the effect of the reform on female migration in regions with higher treatment intensity (column 1) and 
lower treatment intensity (column 2). The DiD estimator is the co-efficient of the interaction of the foreign and post reform dummies. Bootstrapped 
standard errors clustered on region are in parentheses. Region specific dummies, year dummies and quarter dummies are included for each 
regression. Statistical significance is denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. †Calculated using Kennedy’s correction for estimating effect size 
















 (1) (2) 
  Higher intensity pop Lower intensity pop 
 
Ln(population) 
      







Foreign*post interaction -0.150*** -0.130*** 
 
(0.0482) (0.0417) 
Female UR -0.0170 0.00615 
 
(0.0159) (0.00711) 
   Estimated % change†
 
-14.0%*** -12.3%*** 
   Observations 384 256 
Adjusted r2 0.975 0.973 
Region Specific Linear Trend No No 
Regression timespan 2009q1 - 2016q4 2009q1 - 2016q4 
Number of Regions 6 4 
Table 9. Controlling for male unemployment rate and doctors’ IPV related injury reports. 
 
Note: DiD regression results describing the effect of the reform on help-seeking behaviour of victims of IPV when male unemployment rate is 
included as a proxy for the incidence of IPV as a means of interrogating the robustness of our results to changes in underlying rates of IPV (column 
1). In columns 2 and 3, we use foreign and Spanish male unemployment rates respectively to determine whether there is a difference in nationality 
of the perpetrator, given that couples do not sort on nationality. Column 5 presents the DiD results when the number of doctor’s injury reports to 
the court of gender violence are included as a measure of the activity of medical professionals in identifying and reporting cases of IPV. In all 
cases, the DiD estimator is the co-efficient of the interaction of the foreign and post reform dummies. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on 
region are in parentheses. Region specific dummies, year dummies and quarter dummies are included for each regression. Statistical significance is 










for Male UR 
Controlling for 
Foreign Male UR 
Controlling for 





            
Foreign 0.428 0.427 0.434 0.421 0.427 
 
(0.370) (0.371) (0.374) (0.368) (0.371) 
Post-treatment 
0.0361 0.0372 0.0298 0.0526 0.0382 
 
(0.0347) (0.0333) (0.0327) (0.0321) (0.0360) 
Foreign*Post 
-0.168*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.169*** -0.168*** 
 
(0.0541) (0.0541) (0.0538) (0.0544) (0.0541) 
Ln(Female Pop.) 0.550*** 0.551*** 0.549*** 0.554*** 0.550*** 
 
(0.200) (0.200) (0.199) (0.201) (0.200) 
Male UR 
 
-0.000946 0.00374 -0.0157* -0.000937 
  
(0.00500) (0.00269) (0.00917) (0.00489) 
Female UR 0.0134** 0.0135* 0.0125* 0.0147** 0.0135* 
 
(0.00646) (0.00707) (0.00666) (0.00702) (0.00718) 
Ln(Injury 
reports) 
    
0.00759 
     
(0.0367) 
Estimated % 
change† -15.6%*** -15.6%*** -15.5%*** -15.7%*** -15.6%*** 
      
Observations 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 
Adjusted r2 0.949 0.949 0.950 0.950 0.949 
Number of 
Regions 17 17 17 17 17 
Table 10. Difference-in-differences estimates for provincial level analysis & placebo regression. 
 
 (1) (2) 




      
Foreign dummy 0.648*** 0.424 
 
(0.207) (0.382) 
Post-treatment dummy 0.578*** 0.534*** 
 
(0.0776) (0.184) 
Foreign*post interaction -0.185*** -0.0639 
 (0.0296) (0.0531) 
ln(Total Female UR) 
-0.000344  
(0.000990)  
Ln(Female UR by binary nationality) 
 0.0148* 
 (0.00878) 
ln(female population) 0.0218 0.0585 
 
(0.0473) (0.0688) 
   Estimated % change† -16.9%*** -6.3% 
   Observations 3,198 408 
Adjusted r2 0.898 0.954 
Region Specific Linear Trend Yes No 
Regression timespan 2009q1 - 2016q4 2009q1 - 2012q1 
Number of regions 17 17 
Note: Column 1 shows the DiD regression results describing the effect of the reform on help-seeking behaviour of victims of IPV at a provincial 
level to test whether the level of data aggregation affects the results. In this case, female unemployment rate in is total provincial female 
unemployment rate, not by binary nationality. In column 2, we present the DiD results for a placebo regression. We select 2010q3 as the date of 
the placebo reform, allowing for a balance of 6 lead and lag periods. Bootstrapped standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on province in 
Column 1 and region in column 2. Region specific dummies, year dummies and quarter dummies are included for each regression. Statistical 
significance is denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. †Calculated using Kennedy’s correction for estimating effect size using dummy 




Figure 1. Trends in log number of applicants 2009q1-2016q4. 
 
 
Note: A comparison of trends in log number of applicants for protection orders for Spanish women (left 
axis) and foreign women (right axis) during the study period 2009 – 2016. The dashed line at 2012q2 
represents enactment of RDL 16/2012. The solid line corresponds to 2012q4, the first fully treated quarter 























Figure 2. Change in foreign female applicants relative to Spanish over time. 
Note: Event study derived from equation (2) for n=16 periods where t = (1-n, …, 0, …, n]. Parameter estimates are the 
estimates of coefficients on the interaction term between the foreign dummy, which takes 1 for foreign population, and lead 
and lag period specific dummies. Positive estimates signify an increase in foreign applicants relative to Spanish applicants, 
negative estimates indicate a decrease. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals calculated using wild bootstrapped standard 
errors clustered on region. 2009q1 is omitted due to multicollinearity. The dashed line at period -2 represents enactment of 










Source: REDER report, “Anatomy of the healthcare reform”, 2015. 
 
Source: REDER report, “Five myths for five years of health exclusion”, 2017. 
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